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Software Supply Chain Security for CDEs

Securing every link in the software supply chain - from dependencies to builds to deployment - using cloud development environments as enforcement points

Why Supply Chain Security Matters

Modern software is built from hundreds of open-source and third-party components. A single compromised dependency can cascade through thousands of downstream applications, turning your software supply chain into an attack vector that bypasses every traditional security control you have in place.

Cloud Development Environments offer a unique advantage: they provide a centralized, controllable enforcement point where supply chain policies can be applied uniformly across every developer, every build, and every deployment - without relying on individual developer discipline.

The Threat Landscape is Accelerating

Software supply chain attacks have increased over 700% since 2019. The average enterprise application contains 200+ transitive dependencies, each one a potential entry point for malicious code. Organizations that do not implement supply chain security controls are operating on borrowed time.

Regulatory bodies worldwide are now mandating supply chain security controls. The US Executive Order 14028, EU Cyber Resilience Act, and NIST SSDF all require organizations to demonstrate software provenance and dependency transparency.

Attacks That Changed the Industry

CRITICAL

SolarWinds (2020)

Nation-state actors injected a backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion build process. The trojanized update reached 18,000 organizations, including US government agencies.

Build system compromise - no dependency scanning would have caught this
CRITICAL

Log4Shell (2021)

A zero-day vulnerability in Apache Log4j (CVE-2021-44228) affected millions of Java applications. Many organizations spent weeks identifying where Log4j existed in their dependency trees.

SBOMs would have enabled instant identification of affected systems
CRITICAL

XZ Utils Backdoor (2024)

A years-long social engineering campaign inserted a backdoor into the XZ Utils compression library, targeting SSH authentication in Linux distributions. Caught by accident.

Insider threat via maintainer trust - highlights need for reproducible builds
HIGH

Codecov (2021)

Attackers modified a Codecov Bash Uploader script in CI pipelines, exfiltrating environment variables (including secrets and tokens) from thousands of CI/CD environments.

Artifact signing and integrity verification would have detected the tampering

The Dependency Problem

200+
Transitive Dependencies

The average application pulls in over 200 transitive dependencies - packages your direct dependencies depend on, often invisible to your team.

40%
Known Vulnerable

Studies show roughly 40% of open-source packages contain at least one known vulnerability. Without systematic scanning, these flow silently into production.

6 mo
Average Patch Delay

Organizations take an average of 6 months to patch known vulnerabilities in their dependencies, leaving a massive window of exposure.

CDEs as a Centralized Enforcement Point

Unlike traditional development where security policies depend on each developer configuring their local tools correctly, CDEs allow platform teams to enforce supply chain policies at the infrastructure level. Every workspace, every build, and every deployment passes through controls that developers cannot bypass.

Pre-build Dependency scanning, registry allowlisting, SBOM generation
Build Time Hermetic builds, provenance attestation, artifact signing
Post-build Signature verification, deployment policy, continuous monitoring

SBOM: Software Bill of Materials

An SBOM is a comprehensive inventory of every component, library, and dependency in your software. Think of it as a nutrition label for software - it tells consumers exactly what ingredients are inside. In the wake of Log4Shell, SBOMs went from a nice-to-have to a legal requirement in many contexts.

CDEs make SBOM generation automatic and consistent. Instead of relying on developers to run tools locally, platform teams can embed SBOM generation into every workspace build and CI pipeline, ensuring complete and accurate inventories every time.

Why SBOMs Are Now Legally Required

US Executive Order 14028 mandates that software vendors selling to the federal government must provide SBOMs. The EU Cyber Resilience Act extends this to all software sold in EU markets. Organizations without SBOM capabilities face growing procurement and compliance barriers.

SBOM Formats

RECOMMENDED

CycloneDX

An OWASP standard designed for security use cases. Lightweight, machine-readable (JSON/XML), and purpose-built for vulnerability tracking and license compliance. Supports VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) for communicating vulnerability status.

Strengths:
  • Purpose-built for security and compliance
  • Native VEX support for vulnerability communication
  • Broad tooling ecosystem (Syft, Trivy, cdxgen)
  • Supports services, hardware, and ML model BOMs
Best for: Security-focused teams, government procurement, vulnerability management
STANDARD

SPDX

A Linux Foundation / ISO standard (ISO/IEC 5962:2021) with deep roots in license compliance. Widely adopted in the open-source community and supported by major foundations. SPDX 3.0 adds improved security profile support.

Strengths:
  • ISO international standard
  • Strong license compliance tracking
  • Backed by Linux Foundation
  • Wide open-source ecosystem adoption
Best for: License compliance, open-source governance, legal teams

SBOM Generation Tools

CRITICAL

Syft (by Anchore)

Open-source CLI tool that generates SBOMs from container images, filesystems, and archives. Outputs CycloneDX and SPDX formats. Pairs with Grype for vulnerability scanning against generated SBOMs.

CDE Integration: Install Syft in workspace base images. Run automatically during container builds and as a pre-commit hook. Store SBOMs alongside build artifacts for audit trails.
HIGH

Trivy (by Aqua Security)

Comprehensive security scanner that handles vulnerability scanning, misconfiguration detection, secret scanning, and SBOM generation in a single tool. Scans container images, filesystems, Git repositories, and Kubernetes clusters.

CDE Integration: Pre-install in workspace images. Configure as a gate in CI pipelines to block builds with critical vulnerabilities. Combine SBOM generation with vulnerability scanning in a single step.
HIGH

cdxgen

CycloneDX generator that supports over 20 programming languages and build systems. Excellent for polyglot organizations. Produces detailed dependency trees including build-time and test-time dependencies.

CDE Integration: Ideal for workspace templates supporting multiple languages. Run as part of build scripts to auto-generate SBOMs. Integrates with OWASP Dependency-Track for continuous monitoring.

SBOM Lifecycle in a CDE

1

Generate

Auto-generate SBOMs during every build in the CDE workspace using Syft, Trivy, or cdxgen

2

Analyze

Scan SBOMs against vulnerability databases (NVD, OSV, GitHub Advisory) to identify known issues

3

Store

Archive SBOMs with build artifacts in a central repository (Dependency-Track, GUAC) for audit trails

4

Share

Exchange SBOMs with customers, regulators, and partners using standardized formats and SBOM exchange protocols

SLSA Framework: Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

SLSA (pronounced "salsa") is a security framework developed by Google that defines a graduated set of supply chain security levels. Each level builds on the previous one, providing stronger guarantees about how software was built and where it came from.

CDEs are a natural fit for SLSA compliance because they inherently provide a hosted, controlled build platform - satisfying Level 2 requirements out of the box. With additional hardening, CDEs can help organizations reach Level 3 and beyond.

CDEs Accelerate SLSA Compliance

Because CDE workspaces run on centrally managed infrastructure, platform teams can enforce build process controls, generate provenance attestations, and implement non-falsifiable build logs without requiring changes to individual developer workflows. Most organizations using CDEs can achieve SLSA Level 2 with minimal additional effort.

SLSA Levels Explained

LEVEL 0

No Guarantees

No security measures in place. Software is built on developer laptops with no documentation of the build process. There is no provenance information and no way to verify the integrity of build outputs. This is where most organizations start.

Typical Setup: Developer runs builds locally, pushes artifacts directly, no audit trail, no reproducibility
LEVEL 1

Documentation of the Build Process

The build process is documented and produces provenance metadata. Consumers can verify that software was built using a known process, even though the build platform itself may not be secured. This is the first step toward supply chain transparency.

Requirements:
  • Build process exists and is scripted (not manual)
  • Provenance metadata generated (who, what, when, how)
  • Build outputs are identifiable and traceable to source
LEVEL 2

Hosted Build Platform

CDEs PROVIDE THIS

Builds run on a hosted platform (not a developer laptop), and provenance is generated by the platform rather than the developer. This prevents developers from accidentally or intentionally modifying provenance. CDEs naturally satisfy this requirement because all builds run on centrally managed infrastructure.

Requirements:
  • Build runs on a hosted, managed build service
  • Provenance generated by the build platform (not the developer)
  • Provenance is authenticated (signed by the platform)
CDE Advantage: Coder, Ona (formerly Gitpod), and Codespaces workspaces are hosted build platforms by definition
LEVEL 3

Hardened Build Platform

CDEs CAN ENABLE

The build platform provides strong tamper-resistance and non-falsifiable provenance. Builds are isolated from one another, and the provenance cannot be forged even by insiders with access to the build system. CDEs can achieve this with ephemeral workspaces and platform-level attestation.

Requirements:
  • Builds run in isolated, ephemeral environments
  • Provenance is non-falsifiable (tamper-evident logging)
  • Build platform has hardened security controls
  • Source and build dependencies are fully declared
CDE Path: Use ephemeral workspaces, immutable build containers, and signed provenance attestations
LEVEL 4

Two-Person Review & Hermetic Builds

The highest level requires two-person review of all changes, hermetic builds (no network access during build), and fully reproducible builds. This level is aspirational for most organizations but critical for high-security environments such as defense and critical infrastructure.

Requirements:
  • Two-person review of all source changes
  • Hermetic builds (no network access during build)
  • Reproducible builds (same inputs produce identical outputs)
  • All dependencies pinned and verified by hash
Target audience: Defense, critical infrastructure, financial institutions with highest security requirements

Sigstore & Artifact Signing

Artifact signing is the practice of cryptographically signing software artifacts (container images, binaries, SBOMs) to prove their authenticity and integrity. Sigstore is an open-source project that makes signing and verification easy by eliminating the need to manage long-lived cryptographic keys.

In a CDE context, artifact signing ensures that only verified, trusted images and dependencies run in developer workspaces. Platform teams can enforce signature verification policies at the cluster level, preventing unsigned or tampered artifacts from ever reaching a workspace.

Sigstore Ecosystem

CRITICAL

Cosign

Signs and verifies container images and other OCI artifacts. Supports both keyed and keyless signing workflows. Integrates with container registries to store signatures alongside images.

Key Capabilities:
  • Sign container images at build time
  • Attach SBOMs and attestations to images
  • Verify signatures before deployment
  • Works with any OCI-compliant registry
Usage: cosign sign --key cosign.key myregistry/myimage:tag
HIGH

Fulcio

A free certificate authority that issues short-lived signing certificates based on OIDC identity. No need to manage long-lived keys - developers authenticate via SSO and receive ephemeral certificates for signing.

Key Capabilities:
  • Keyless signing (no private key management)
  • Identity-based certificates via OIDC/SSO
  • Short-lived certificates (minutes, not years)
  • Integrates with corporate identity providers
CDE Benefit: Developers sign artifacts using their SSO identity - no key distribution needed
HIGH

Rekor

An immutable, tamper-evident transparency log that records signing events. Think of it as a public ledger for software signatures - anyone can verify that an artifact was signed at a specific time by a specific identity, and the log cannot be altered retroactively.

Key Capabilities:
  • Immutable record of all signing events
  • Tamper-evident via Merkle tree structure
  • Publicly auditable transparency log
  • Timestamp authority for proving when signing occurred
Even if signing keys are compromised later, Rekor proves when legitimate signatures occurred

Enforcing Signed Images in CDE Workspaces

CRITICAL

Admission Control

Use Kubernetes admission controllers (Kyverno, OPA Gatekeeper, or Sigstore Policy Controller) to enforce that only signed images can run in CDE workspaces. Unsigned or unverified images are rejected before they start.

Policy Examples:
  • Require Cosign signature from trusted key/identity
  • Verify SBOM attestation is attached
  • Check vulnerability scan attestation (no critical CVEs)
  • Validate provenance against SLSA requirements
HIGH

Workspace Template Signing

Sign workspace templates (Terraform modules, DevContainer configs) to ensure they have not been modified since approval. Developers can only launch workspaces from signed, verified templates.

Workflow:
  • Platform team creates and reviews template
  • Template is signed with platform team key
  • CDE platform verifies signature at workspace creation
  • Any template modification invalidates signature

End-to-End Verification Pipeline

A complete artifact verification pipeline ensures that every component running in your CDE has a verifiable chain of custody - from source code commit through build, signing, and deployment.

Source Signed commits, branch protection
Build Hosted platform, provenance attestation
Sign Cosign + Fulcio, Rekor log entry
Verify Admission control, policy enforcement

CDE Policy Enforcement

The true power of CDEs for supply chain security lies in platform-level policy enforcement. Unlike local development where security depends on individual developer compliance, CDEs allow platform teams to encode supply chain policies directly into the infrastructure. Developers work within guardrails they cannot circumvent.

These controls should be applied progressively - start with monitoring and warnings, then gradually move to hard enforcement as the team adapts and exceptions are documented.

CRITICAL

Allowlisted Package Registries

Configure CDE workspaces to only pull packages from approved internal registries or vetted mirrors. Block direct access to public registries like npmjs.com, PyPI, and Docker Hub. All packages must flow through an internal proxy that scans and caches approved versions.

Implementation:
  • Deploy Artifactory, Nexus, or AWS CodeArtifact as internal registry proxy
  • Configure npm, pip, Maven, and Go module proxies in workspace templates
  • Enable automatic vulnerability scanning on package ingestion
  • Block packages with critical vulnerabilities or restrictive licenses
Warning: Direct public registry access from CDE workspaces is a major supply chain risk vector
CRITICAL

Dependency Scanning in Workspace Images

Bake dependency scanning tools into every workspace base image. Run automated scans when workspaces start, when dependencies change, and as part of every CI build. Flag or block dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities.

Scanning Layers:
Base image OS packages
Language-specific packages (npm, pip, Maven)
Project dependency lock files
Build tool plugins and extensions
Best Practice: Use Trivy or Grype pre-installed in workspace images for zero-config scanning
HIGH

Build Environment Lockdown (Reproducible Builds)

Ensure builds are reproducible by locking down the entire build environment - same OS, same tools, same dependency versions. Use immutable workspace images with pinned tool versions. Developers should not be able to install arbitrary build tools.

Lockdown Strategies:
  • Pin all dependency versions in lock files (package-lock.json, go.sum, etc.)
  • Use digest-pinned base images (sha256 references, not tags)
  • Pre-cache all dependencies in workspace images
  • Disable arbitrary package installation at build time
Reproducible builds are a SLSA Level 4 requirement and defense against build-time tampering
HIGH

Network Egress Policies for Package Downloads

Control which external endpoints CDE workspaces can reach during builds. Use Kubernetes NetworkPolicies or cloud-native firewall rules to restrict egress to approved package registries and service endpoints only.

Egress Allow List:
  • Internal artifact registry (Artifactory, Nexus)
  • Source control (GitHub, GitLab)
  • Container registry (ECR, GCR, ACR)
  • All other external endpoints blocked
Start with monitoring mode to identify legitimate traffic before enabling strict blocking
MEDIUM

Pre-approved Base Images & Dependency Caches

Maintain a curated catalog of pre-approved, scanned base images for CDE workspaces. Each image should include pre-cached, vetted dependencies for common project types. This eliminates the need for runtime package downloads and ensures consistency.

Image Catalog Strategy:
Node.js workspace (LTS + common deps)
Python workspace (3.x + data science stack)
Go workspace (latest stable + proto tools)
Java workspace (JDK + Maven/Gradle cache)
Rebuild and rescan images weekly to incorporate security patches

Regulatory Landscape

The regulatory environment for software supply chain security has transformed dramatically since 2021. Governments worldwide are mandating that software producers demonstrate transparency, provenance, and vulnerability management for their products. Organizations that fail to comply face procurement exclusion, fines, and legal liability.

CDEs help organizations meet these requirements by providing a controlled, auditable environment where compliance controls can be enforced automatically. Platform teams can demonstrate that builds occurred in secured environments with proper attestation and logging.

CRITICAL

US Executive Order 14028

Signed in May 2021, EO 14028 mandates sweeping improvements to the nation's cybersecurity, with specific requirements for software supply chain security. Any software vendor selling to the US federal government must comply.

Key Requirements:
  • Provide SBOMs for all software sold to federal agencies
  • Attest to secure development practices (NIST SSDF)
  • Implement automated vulnerability disclosure and remediation
  • Use multi-factor authentication and encrypted communications
  • Maintain comprehensive audit logs for software development
CDE Impact: CDEs enable SBOM generation, audit logging, and MFA enforcement at the platform level
CRITICAL

EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)

The CRA establishes mandatory cybersecurity requirements for all products with digital elements sold in the EU market. It applies to commercial software, hardware, and connected devices - including software components and libraries.

Key Requirements:
  • Mandatory vulnerability handling and disclosure processes
  • Provide SBOMs in machine-readable format
  • Security updates for the product lifetime (minimum 5 years)
  • Report actively exploited vulnerabilities within 24 hours
  • Fines up to 15 million euros or 2.5% of global turnover
Warning: Applies to any software sold in the EU, regardless of where it was developed
HIGH

NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF)

The Secure Software Development Framework defines a core set of practices for secure software development. It is the foundation for EO 14028 compliance attestations and provides a structured approach to integrating security into the development lifecycle.

Practice Groups:
PO: Prepare the Organization Security requirements, roles, tooling
PS: Protect the Software Source integrity, build protection, artifact security
PW: Produce Well-Secured Software Design review, code review, testing
RV: Respond to Vulnerabilities Monitoring, analysis, remediation, disclosure
CDEs directly support PS (Protect Software) and PW (Produce Well-Secured Software) practice groups
HIGH

FedRAMP Supply Chain Requirements

FedRAMP Rev 5 includes specific supply chain risk management controls (SR family) that cloud service providers must implement. These controls apply to the entire software development lifecycle, including the tools and environments used to build software.

Key Controls:
  • SR-3: Supply chain controls and processes
  • SR-4: Provenance tracking for components
  • SR-5: Acquisition strategies and tools
  • SR-11: Component authenticity (signing/verification)
CDE Impact: Centralized build environments simplify FedRAMP supply chain control evidence collection

Compliance Coverage Matrix

How CDE-enforced supply chain controls map to major regulatory requirements:

SBOM Generation EO 14028, CRA, FedRAMP SR-4
Artifact Signing SSDF PS, FedRAMP SR-11, SLSA L2+
Vulnerability Scanning CRA, SSDF RV, EO 14028, FedRAMP
Audit Logging All frameworks, SOC 2, HITRUST

Implementation Checklist

Implementing supply chain security is a journey, not a destination. Start with foundational controls and progressively add enforcement layers as your organization matures. Attempting to implement everything at once will overwhelm teams and create resistance.

The checklist below follows a phased approach - each phase builds on the previous one and should be completed before moving to the next. Most organizations can complete Phase 1 within a few weeks and should plan 3-6 months for full implementation.

Phase 1

Foundation (Weeks 1-4)

START HERE

SBOM Generation

Begin by generating SBOMs for all projects. Install Syft or Trivy in CDE workspace base images and configure them to produce CycloneDX SBOMs during every build. Store SBOMs alongside build artifacts. This provides immediate visibility into your dependency landscape.

  • Choose SBOM format (CycloneDX recommended)
  • Install generation tool in workspace base images
  • Configure automatic generation during CI builds
  • Set up SBOM storage (artifact registry or Dependency-Track)
  • Generate SBOMs for all existing production applications

Dependency Inventory & Vulnerability Scanning

Use generated SBOMs to create a complete inventory of all dependencies across your organization. Scan against vulnerability databases (NVD, OSV) to identify known issues. Begin in monitoring mode - report findings but do not block builds.

  • Scan all SBOMs against vulnerability databases
  • Identify and prioritize critical vulnerabilities
  • Set up automated scanning notifications (Slack, email)
  • Create a vulnerability remediation backlog
Phase 2

Progressive Enforcement (Months 2-3)

Internal Registry Proxy

Deploy an internal package registry proxy (Artifactory, Nexus, or CodeArtifact). Route all CDE workspace package downloads through the proxy. Enable vulnerability scanning on ingestion. Start in pass-through mode while building the package cache.

  • Deploy internal registry proxy
  • Configure workspace templates to use internal proxy
  • Enable ingestion scanning (warn mode)
  • Begin building license compliance database

Artifact Signing Pipeline

Implement Cosign signing for container images produced by CDE builds. Set up Fulcio for keyless signing using developer SSO identities. Configure Rekor logging. Start with signing only - do not enforce verification yet.

  • Install Cosign in CI pipeline templates
  • Configure keyless signing with Fulcio + corporate OIDC
  • Enable Rekor transparency logging
  • Attach SBOM attestations to signed images

Build Warnings (Warn Before Block)

Enable warning-mode policies for builds that use unscanned dependencies, pull from unapproved registries, or lack signatures. Developers see warnings but builds still succeed. This trains teams and surfaces issues before enforcement.

Track warning frequency to identify which policies will cause the most friction when enforced
Phase 3

Hard Enforcement (Months 3-5)

Block Unapproved Packages

Switch registry proxy from pass-through to blocking mode. Packages with critical vulnerabilities or unapproved licenses are rejected. Implement an exception process for legitimate cases with time-limited waivers.

  • Enable blocking for critical/high vulnerabilities
  • Implement waiver/exception request workflow
  • Block restricted licenses (GPL in proprietary projects)
  • Restrict network egress to approved endpoints only

Enforce Signature Verification

Deploy admission controllers (Kyverno or Sigstore Policy Controller) to reject unsigned or unverified images in CDE namespaces. Only images signed by trusted identities with valid provenance attestations can run.

  • Deploy Sigstore Policy Controller or Kyverno
  • Define trusted signer identities and keys
  • Require SBOM attestation for all workspace images
  • Enable audit mode first, then enforce after validation
Phase 4

Maturity & Continuous Improvement (Month 6+)

Measure Supply Chain Security Maturity

Establish metrics to track your supply chain security posture over time. Dashboard key indicators and report trends to leadership. Use SLSA levels as a maturity benchmark.

Key Metrics:
SBOM coverage (% of projects with SBOMs)
Vulnerability remediation time (MTTR)
Signed artifact percentage
Policy exception count and trends
SLSA level achieved per project
Dependency freshness (% up-to-date)

Integration with Security Ecosystem

Connect supply chain security data with your broader security operations. Feed SBOM data into your SIEM, vulnerability data into your risk management platform, and signing events into your audit system.

  • Integrate SBOM data with SIEM/SOAR platforms
  • Connect vulnerability findings to risk management
  • Automate compliance evidence collection
  • Implement SBOM sharing with customers and partners
  • Pursue SLSA Level 3 certification for critical projects

Continuous Policy Refinement

Supply chain security is not a one-time implementation. Continuously refine policies based on new threats, changing regulations, and team feedback. Review exception requests quarterly and tighten policies as the organization matures.

Review and update policies quarterly based on threat intelligence and compliance changes

Getting Started Today

Do not wait for a complete strategy before taking action. The most impactful first step is generating SBOMs for your existing applications. This alone provides visibility into your dependency landscape and positions you to respond rapidly when the next Log4Shell-scale vulnerability emerges.

Week 1 Install Trivy in one workspace image. Generate your first SBOM.
Week 2 Scan SBOMs for vulnerabilities. Share findings with engineering leadership.
Week 3 Roll out SBOM generation to all CDE workspace images. Start building your inventory.